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155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998)
I. Facts
Kenneth L. Wilson was charged with murder during the commission of
attempted rape, attempted rape, grand larceny, and several counts of abduction
and malicious wounding for the 1993 killing of Jacqueline Stephens.1 The jury
found Wilson guilty on all charges and recommended a sentence of death based
upon both the future dangerousness and vileness aggravators.2 Subsequently, the
trial court sentenced Wilson to death.3
Prior to trial, Wilson's original trial counsel requested the appointment of
a psychologist to evaluate Wilson's sanity at the time of the offense, along with
his competency to stand trial.4 The court appointed Dr. Don Killian, a clinical
psychologist, who subsequently evaluated Wilson and determined that he was
sane at the time of the offense and competent to stand trial.' His examination
of Wilson consisted of a ninety minute interview, during which he "explored
Wilson's educational background, medical history, and criminal record" and
"evaluated Wilson's cognitive processes and understanding of the legal proceed-
ings against him."6 AsJudge Michael noted in his partial concurrence, Dr. Killian
did not perform any diagnostic tests or examine any of Wilson's medical or
educational records, instead relying exclusively upon his interview with Wilson
for relevant information.7 He also failed to consider evidence of the amount of
drugs in Wilson's system at the time of the commission of the offense.8
Several months later, Wilson's new trial counsel filed a "Motion for Neuro-
logical, Psychological, Psychiatric and Physical Evaluation of the Defendant."9
The trial court granted the motion and again appointed Dr. Killian to conduct
the requested evaluation. When Dr. Killian met with Wilson to conduct the
evaluation, Wilson refused to discuss "his thoughts, feelings, or actions" around
the time the offense occurred, explaining that his attorneys had advised that he
1. Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396, 399-400 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. WiLron, 155 F.3d at 400.
3. Id
4. Id at 399-400.
5. Id. at 400. He presented information about Wilson's sanity at the time of the offense in
a separate report prepared for the defense only. Wiion, 155 F.3d at 400.
6. Id. at 402.
7. Id. at 411 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
8. Id. (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
9. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 400.
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not "discuss the details of these activities with anyone."'" Ostensibly, Wilson did
so based upon the fact that his counsel had notified the Commonwealth two days
before the proposed second examination of his intention to introduce mental
health defenses, which dictated that Dr. Killian would be required to share the
results of the examination with the Commonwealth.
Following the jury's conviction of Wilson on all counts and the trial court's
imposition of the death sentence, Wilson appealed directly to the Supreme Court
of Virginia. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied relief and
upheld Wilson's conviction and sentence. 1 The United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari on October 2, 1995, and the conviction became final.'
2
In preparation for Wilson's federal habeas petition, his counsel utilized the
information developed by Dr. Brad Fisher, a forensic clinical psychologist
appointed by the court to assist the defense. Dr. Fisher conducted a thorough
evaluation ofWilson, which entailed meeting with Wilson, examining his medical
and family history, and reviewing parts of the trial transcript. 3 Dr. Fisher
determined that, "the evidence is suggestive but not conclusive about the exis-
tence of a temporary condition that might have led to a plea of insanity."' 4
Both the Supreme Court of Virginia and the district court denied Wilson's
habeas petitions, and Wilson subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals." On appeal, he advanced several arguments regarding the perfor-
mance of both his court-appointed mental health expert and his trial counsel. He
claimed that Dr. Killian did not perform an "appropriate" evaluation of his sanity
under the standard enunciated in Ake v. Oklahoma.'6 Wilson also alleged that his
trial counsel erred by (1) failing to adequately investigate several possible mental
health defenses and (2) making a deficient request for a mental health evaluation
which deprived him of the benefit of a confidential report. 7 In large part,
Wilson based the aforementioned claims upon Dr. Fisher's findings.'" Addition-
ally, Wilson asserted two claims of actual innocence based upon (1) his temporary
insanity at the time of the commission of the crime and (2) his extreme intoxica-
tion at the time of the commission of the crime (which indicated that he did not
have the menr ra to commit an intentional crime).' Wilson also alleged that the
10. Id
11. See Wilson v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1995).
12. See Wilson v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 841 (1995).
13. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 400.
14. Id
15. Id
16. 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (holding that some indigent criminal defendants are entitled to
"access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense").
17. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 403.
18. Id at 400.
19. Id at 403. By the court's account, Wilson "assert[ed] that he raise[d] these claims simply
as .'gateway[s]" through which he may pass to argue the merits of his defaulted claims."' Id at 404,
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jury had convicted him of attempted rape based upon insufficient evidence-in
particular, unsubstantiated physical evidence.'0 Finally, Wilson contended that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required the trial court to notify the jury
of the actual effect of his life sentence, which would have rendered him ineligible
for parole for at least twenty-five years.2'
II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held that Ake
only grants indigent defendants access to a mental health expert and that there is
no constitutional right to effective assistance of such an expert, notwithstanding
Ake's requirement of an "appropriate examination."' In addition, the court
found that even if the term "appropriate" suggests the requirement of a "minimal
level of professional competence" on the part of the mental health expert, Dr.
Killian met any such standard.' The court disposed of Wilson's ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on the same grounds. The court also rejected both
of Wilson's actual innocence claims.24 In addition, the court rejected Wilson's
insufficient evidence claim, holding that with or without the physical evidence in
question, the jury could have found that Wilson made an overt act toward the
consummation of rape and formed the requisite intent to rape. Thus, the court
determined that the jury could have found that Wilson attempted to rape the
victim." Finally, the court held that neither the Eight Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment entitled Wilson to an instruction regarding his parole
eligibility.
26
(quoting Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d 561, 570 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 595 (1997)). Thus, he
based his actual innocence daims upon Dr. Fisher's findings, as well.
20. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 405. At trial, the Commonwealth sought to make the requisite
showing for capital murder by relying primarily upon evidence that "[p]ubic hairs and a dried white
substance which appeared to be semen were observed on [the victim's] body," as proof of at-
tempted rape. Id at 399.
21. Id at 407. This summary will address only those issues raised by the performance of the
defendant's mental health expert and the effect of this performance upon defense counsel's
performance.
22. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
23. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 402.
24. Id at 405. With respect to Wilson's first claim of actual innocence, the court noted that
voluntary intoxication provides a defense only when it causes permanent insanity and found that
even given the information contained within Dr. Fisher's report, a reasonable juror "would have
had almost no reason to condude that voluntary intoxication had produced a permanent insanity
in Wilson." Id With respect to Wilson's second claim of actual innocence, the court determined
that a reasonable juror aware of Dr. Fisher's findings could have found that Wilson's severe
intoxication did not negate his mens rea and thus found Wilson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id
25. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 406-07..
26. Id at 408. The court determined that in Simmons v. South Camna, 512 U.S. 154 (1994),
the Supreme Court held only that "a capital defendant, as a matter of due process, should be
1998]
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III. Anaylsis/Application in Virginia
A. What Ake Means in the Fourth Circuit: Constitutionaly MandatedAccess to an
Ineffective Mental Health Epert, or More?
1. The Majority's Strained Interpretation of Ake t Mandate
The Court cited several factors in support of its determination that Ake
does not grant indigent criminal defendants the right to the effective assistance
of expert witnesses. The court noted the practical concern that requiring effec-
tive assistance of expert witnesses and, in effect, implementing a malpractice
standard by which to judge the performance of mental health experts, would
result in an "endless battle" between experts which the federal courts would be
forced, inappropriately, to arbitrate.' The court also found that allowing federal
courts to judge the efficacy of particular psychiatric examinations would "under-
mine the finality of state criminal convictions."'2 In addition, the court suggested
that it would be inappropriate for the federal courts, on collateral review, to
intrude upon the role of state trial courts by engaging in malpractice review of
mental health experts' performance.'
Primarily, the court attacked Wilson's interpretation of Ake on the basis of
its facts and distinguished Wilson's case from Ake, where the total failure to
provide the defendant with any evaluation was found to violate the Due Process
Clause.30 The court declined to credit Wilson's reading of Ake's grant of an
"appropriate evaluation" as suggesting a constitutionally mandated minimum
standard for psychiatric care and, instead, confined Ake to its precise facts.3'
The court concluded its analysis of Wilson's Ake claim by noting that
Wilson, himself, was "partly responsible for the difficulties that Dr. Killian
encountered in conducting a more complete examination."32 Wilson had reiter-
ated his desire that he not be evaluated in response to the in-court questioning
of the trial judge. Because Wilson "repeatedly" declined to share his thoughts
permitted to inform the jury that he is parole ineligible if the state argues that he presents a future
danger." Id at 407. In keeping with the Fourth Circuit's reading of Simmons, the court relied upon
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in making that assessment. The court refused to extend the
Simmons analysis to cases in which a defendant is not parole ineligible; explaining, "[o]ther courts
share our reading of Simmons and hold that it does not entitle a defendant to an instruction about
when he would become eligible for parole." Id at 408.
27. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 400-01.
28. Id at 401.
29. Id
30. Id
31. Wilon, 155 F.3d at 401. Again, the court found that even if Ake provided for some
constitutionally mandated minimum standard of psychiatric care, Dr. Killian met that standard. Id
at 402.
32. Id. It is important to note that as to an examination conducted pursuant to a defense of
insaniy, a defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402
(1987). The same is not true, however, of the prosecution's expert's reciprocal examination of a
defendant concerning mitigation. SeeJackson v. Commonwealth, 11 Cap. Def. J. 197, 204 (1998).
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and feelings around the time of the commission of the crime, the court found
that Dr. Killian's examination satisfied any minimum standard of care that may
be provided for by Ake.
33
2. The Partial Concumnce's CompellingArgument
In his partially concurring opinionJudge Michael agreed with the majority's
assessment thatAke did not entitle Wilson to the effective assistance of a mental
health expert, but noted that Wilson had not made such a claim. Instead, he
explained, Wilson asserted only that he was entitled to an "appropriate examina-
tion," which Judge Michael defined as "a sanity examination that met the mini-
mum standard of care for clinical psychologists," or "an examination that was
not so flawed that it constituted malpractice." ' Judge Michael agreed with
Wilson's assertion regarding his entitlement to an appropriate examination as well
as his allegation that Dr. Killian had failed to provide him with an appropriate
examination. He stated, "[d]ue process required Dr. Killian to give Wilson a
thorough examination that met the minimum standard of care set by the clinical
psychology profession."
35
Judge Michael determined that although Ake did not directly address the
question of "whether an indigent defendant is entitled to a court-appointed
psychiatrist whose psychiatric examination does not constitute malpractice," its
reasoning "suggests a broader rule, that a court-appointed psychiatrist cannot
commit malpractice when examining a defendant."3' 6 He cited the Supreme
Court's intention that the right to a psychiatrist operate similarly to the right to
counsel, which the Court, in several key cases, found to encompass the right to
effective assistance of counsel.37 Finally, Judge Michael explained that without
the right to an appropriate examination, the right to a mental health expert is
"meaningless." 3 He concluded by noting that although the majority did not
address this question, he would have held that "a defendant has the right to an
'appropriate' mental examination, just as Ake said."'39
In applying this standard to Dr. Killian's examination of Wilson, Judge
Michael found Dr. Killian's performance to be deficient in many respects. In
33. Vilson, 155 F.3d at 403. Again, as Judge Michael's partial concurrence indicates, Wilson
apparently refused to discuss his thoughts and feelings around the time of the commission of the
crime because of his understanding that based upon his counsel's untimely request for an expert,
the expert would have to share his findings with the Commonwealth.
34. Id. at 409 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
35. Id (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
36. Id. (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
37. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 409-10 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (citing Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); & Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985))) (Michael,J., concurring
in part & concurring in the judgment).
38. Id. at 410 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
39. Id (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
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general, he found that "Dr. Killian failed [to] follow the bare minimum of
procedures necessary for an adequate sanity examination."4 However, Judge
Michael found that Wilson's claims regarding Dr. Killian's examination were
procedurally defaulted and thus concurred in the judgment.
B. Can Defense Counsel Deliver Effective Assistance When the
Mental Health Expert Is Ineffective?
1. The Majority's Summary Rejection of the Plaintiffs Claim
The court rejected Wilson's ineffective assistance of counsel claims based
exclusively upon its finding that Dr. Killian's examination of Wilson was suffi-
cient. Wilson had asserted that his attorney had provided ineffective assistance
both by (1) failing to investigate and/or develop at trial the possible mental
health defenses that he was insane or that he lacked the mens rea to commit the
crime and (2) making a deficient request for a mental health evaluation which
deprived Wilson of his right to a confidential report."1
The court reiterated the governing standard, which required Wilson to show
that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness" and that but for his counsel's deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.4 2 Ultimately,
the court determined that Wilson's trial counsel reasonably relied upon Dr.
Killian's report, which concluded that Wilson was not mentally ill at the time of
the commission of the crime. The court stated, "[t]o be reasonably effective,
counsel was not required to second-guess the contents of this report."43 Judge
Michael's discussion of this part of the majority's analysis is instructive insofar
as it highlights the fact that the majority effectively placed the burden of assessing
the sufficiency of a mental health expert's examination solely upon defense
counsel."
The court also characterized Wilson's trial counsel's failure to investigate
and/or develop these defenses as "reasonable" on account of Wilson's statement
to his counsel that someone else had committed the crime.4" The mental health
defenses Wilson later sought to assert, the court explained, would have been
inconsistent with that theory.46
Finally, the court found that even if Wilson's trial counsel's performance
had been somehow deficient, his errors had not been prejudicial.47 The court
40. Id at 411 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
41. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 403.
42. Id (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
43. Id
44. See id at 413 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
45. Id




made this determination based upon its judgment that Dr. Fisher's report did not
conclusively support Wilson's theory that he was temporarily.insane and lacked
the mens rea to commit the crime." Thus, the court disposed of Wilson's ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims.
1. The Partial Concurrence's Though#fulAnaylsis of This Conundrum
Judge Michael asserted that the majority erred in rejecting both of Wilson's
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. He explained that with respect to the first
claim (regarding defense counsel's failure to explore the insanity defense), courts
should focus upon the adequacy of the examination, rather than defense counsel's
assessment of it. As the previous section notes, Judge Michael found that Dr.
Killian did not perform an appropriate examination. In addition, Judge Michael
stated that Wilson's counsel was "ineffective in preparing Dr. Killian for the first
examination and, possibly, for failing to obtain a second opinion."'49 With respect
to Wilson's second claim, Judge Michael determined that Wilson's counsel was
ineffective in failing to make a timely request for a second examination. Judge
Michael found both of these claims to be procedurally defaulted, as well. °
Judge Michael stated that, "a defendant must be able to vindicate his Ake
right to an appropriate examination through a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel," and concluded that the majority opinion did not "creat[e] a general rule
that defense counsel is never required to second-guess the court-appointed
psychiatrist's mental evaluation of the defendant.""1 Instead, he read the majority
opinion in the context of the facts and suggested that because the majority
hinged the ineffective assistance inquiry to the adequacy of the mental examina-
tion, the majority "would place the full burden of spotting psychiatrist malprac-
tice on defense counsel by putting counsel in charge of ensuring that the Ake
right is protected." 2
In response, Judge Michael contended that the majority was misguided in
holding defense counsel solely responsible for the adequacy of a mental health
expert's examination due to the very nature of the work that attorneys and
mental health experts perform. He articulated his preference for an approach
which would divide the labor between the defense attorney and the mental health
expert. He would allocate the burden of ensuring an appropriate examination to
the psychiatrist, while holding defense counsel responsible for the failure to
recognize "obvious malpractice" and/or to request a second opinion when it
appears to be necessary. 3 He would also hold defense counsel responsible for
48. Id.
49. Id at 412 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
50. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 412 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 412-13 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
52. Id at 413 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
53. Id at 414-15 (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
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failing to prepare the mental health expert adequately for the examination. Under
Judge Michael's approach, which would entail two separate standards for mal-
practice, a defendant could conceivably win an Ake claim while losing an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim.54
Ultimately,Judge Michael decided that Wilson's defense counsel was ineffec-
tive for failing to provide Dr. Killian access to relevant records and, possibly, in
declining to pursue an insanity defense.5 He also determined that defense
counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain a confidential second examination.
5 6
Subsequently, Judge Michael deemed both claims procedurally defaulted.
7
C. Some Practical Suggestions in the Aftermath ofWilson
As a preliminary matter, it is important to remember that although neither
section 19.2-264.3:1 of the Virginia Code (commonly referred to as "3:1") nor,
most probably, Ake entitles a defendant to the expert of his or her choice,
defense counsel may significantly increase the chances of obtaining a desirable
expert by taking several crucial steps. Defense counsel should locate and re-
search potential experts, obtain the comitment of a good expert, and gather
preliminary evidence on the need for an expert. Next, defense counsel should
present that information to the court in conjunction with the request for expert
assistance.
If defense counsel comes to have doubts about the capabilities of a court-
appointed mental health expert, the pronouncements of the Wilson majority
regarding Ake and ineffective assistance provide a guide for action that must be
taken at the trial level to avoid default. Again, the majority effectively placed the
burden of ensuring the adequate performance of mental health experts upon
defense counsel. Alternatively, defense counsel may utilize Judge Michael's
thorough partial concurrence to preserve the issue and, at the point at which
defense counsel has misgivings, move for a second expert to determine whether
the original expert has performed at a minimally acceptable professional level.
As the Wilson majority indicated, this issue must be raised at trial and, if the
motion is denied at trial, the denial must be challenged on direct appeal.
The optimal ground for seeking the "second opinion" expert is that denial
will constitute institutional ineffective assistance of counsel. That is, the Com-
monwealth will prevent counsel from providing the client with the assistance
required by Strickland v. Washington.
5 8
54. Wilson, 155 F.3d at 415 (Michael,J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
55. Id (Michael, J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
56. Id at 416 (Michael,J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
57. Id. at 415-16 (Michael,J., concurring in part & concurring in the judgment).
58. 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Based upon Judge Michael's analysis, defense counsel should also
strive to provide effective assistance in terms of assisting the mental health expert by providing the
information necessary to prepare the expert for the examination, etc.
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In sum, defense counsel may navigate this procedural and theoretical
minefield in several ways. Defense counsel should seek to avoid this set of
problems by obtaining only good experts, although that is not always possible.
Defense counsel should select one of the several available means of preserving
the Ake-type claim. The court's suggestion that a minimum standard may exist
certainly lays the groundwork for such a claim. In addition to rejecting the
Fourth Circuit's reading ofAke, defense counsel should attempt to obtain second
experts in the case of any misgivings about the original experts. In essence,
defense counsel could argue that if the Commonwealth refuses to grant him a
second expert, the Commonwealth will effectively prevent him from rendering
effective assistance of counsel. Finally, it is important to remember that although
the court did not read the language in Ake to mean what the United States
Supreme Court ostensibly meant for it to say, these issues are largely unsettled
and, thus, should be preserved on both state and federal grounds.
Anne Duprey

